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Abstract- Internet enabled wireless devices continue to 
proliferate and are expected to surpass traditional Internet in the 
near future. However, data security and privacy remains major 
concerns in the current generation of wireless connectivity. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol used within the 802.11 
standard has “major security flaws” thus WLANs using the 
protocol are vulnerable to attacks. I n  this paper, we propose a 
scrambling algorithm that reduces the vulnerability of the WEP. 
Both the software and hardware implementations of the 
algorithm reveal at least 10,000 times improvement in security. 
Keywords: wireless LAN, 802.11, security, WEP. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless technology has become an integral part of today’s 
life. The use of wireless networking is rapidly rising with an 
ever-increasing need for businesses to cut costs and to provide 
mobility to workers. The wireless technology has spread to 
devices from small-embedded systems to large general purpose 
PCs. This is due to cheaper prices, faster speeds and also due to 
the need for greater mobility. It is desirable to have as much 
data privacy as possible. Hence in today’s networked world 
security is at a premium. Wireless network is very essential, as 
it is not bound to any region. Any unauthorized person can 
read, change or use the private data. Wired equivalent privacy 
(WEP) is a security protocol, specified in the IEEE Wireless 
Fidelity (Wi-Fi) standard, 802.11 [I], that is designed to 
provide a wireless local area network (WLAN) with a level of 
security and privacy comparable to what is usually expected of 
a wired LAN. WEP seeks to establish similar protection to that 
offered by the wired network‘s physical security measures by 
encrypting data transmitted over the WLAN. Data encryption 
protects the vulnerable wireless link between clients and access 
points; once this measure has been taken, other typical LAN 
security mechanisms such as password protection, end-to-end 
encryption, virtual private networks (VPNs), and authentication 
can be put in place to ensure privacy. However, WEP has 
“major security flaws” thus WLANs using the protocol are 
vulnerable to attacks [2,3]. These so called wireless equivalent 
privacy attacks show themselves in the form of intercepting 
and modifying the transmissions, and gaining access to 
restricted networks. In this paper, we propose an algorithm to 
patch WEP protocol against these attacks. 
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11. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OUR APPROACH 
WEP uses RC4 enclyption algorithm [4], which operates by 
expanding a short key into an infinite pseudo-random key 
stream. If an anacker flips a bit in the cipher text, then upon 
decryption, the corresponding hit in the plaintext will be 
flipped. If an eavesdropper intercepts two cipher text encrypted 
with the same key stream, it is possible to obtain the XOR of 
the two plaintexts. Knowledge of this XOR can enable 
statistical attacks to recover the plaintexts. The statistical 
attacks become increasingly practical as more cipher text that 
use the same key stream are known. Once one of the plaintexts 
becomes known, it is trivial to recover all of the others. To 
ensure that a packet has not been modified, WEP uses,an 
Integrity Check Value (ICV) field in the packet. To avoid 
encrypting two cipher text with the same key stream, an 
initialization vector (IV) is used to augment the shared key and 
produce a different RC4 key for each packet. The major attacks 
to WEP are given as follows: 
1. Active attack Modification of the packet by mod/fying the 
ICV. 
2. Passive attacks: 
a. 
b. 
Integrity violation by analyzing the IV 
Table based attack for decrypting every packet that 
is sent over the wireless link. 
In order to avoid these attacks, we propose a novel Scrambling 
algorithm, which randomize the data from the unauthorized 
user by adding some standard randomness to it. This random 
characteristic is a function of the private attribute shared 
between transmitter and receiver only. In this approach the 
randomness is achieved by RC4 algorithm and distribution of 
randomness is provided with different algorithms to increase 
the complexity of rectifying the encrypted data and optimize 
utilization of randomness. 
A .  The Algorithms 
In the Scrambling, Algorithm (SA), a random octet is 
inserted in a random position. The random position is obtained 
by RC4 as a function of the secret key. Currently, the octets 
contain random information, however, we are in the process of 
developing ways to utilize these octets for further improvement 
in security of the packets (e.g., dynamically changing secret 
keys (TUP)). Octet insertion as shown in Fig.1 is applied to 
three different fields in the packet format, namely, ICV, IV and 
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Figure I : Packet formats for the WEP and modified WEP by the scrambling algorithm 
cipher text , to reduce the vulnerability for each of the attacks 
mentioned above. One octet is inserted for both ICV and IV. 
However, due to the length and to improve the security, more 
octets are inserted to the cipher text. In the cipher text, the SA 
distribute the random octets at random positions in such a way 
that density of octets reduces along with the length of the 
packet, which ensures insignificant increase in the packet size 
for large packets. 
Each field (IV, cipher text , ICV) uses one RC4 key-stream 
octet, to find random position for insertion of random octet. 
Thus every packet requires 3 RC4 octets from key-stream, so 
the key stream is divided in set of 3 octets and one set is used 
for one WEP frame. We have two major algorithms for 
inserting the random octet at a random position. Algorithm 1, 
which is used to randomize IV and ICV; is using 5 lower bits 
of first octet from a set to randomize IV and 5 lower bits of 
third octet to randomize ICV. Depending upon the value of 
these 5 bits it inserts random octet in IV and ICV. 
Alporithm I :  IV and ICV randomizations i extraction 
For entire transmission 
Fetch packet-number and IV/ICV from 802. I I protocol 
Fetch random data content for the octetfiom memory 
Calculate~randomgosition(RC4(secret~kw) 
[ i *packet-nurnher]~ield-leugth) 
Insert/Extract the octet at the calculated random 
position 
End for 
where i is the number of RC4 octets used per packet for 
randomness. 
Algorithm 2 is using the second octet of the set to 
randomize cipher text. The distrihutiveAlgorithm used in 
Algorithm2; uses the LSBs of octet to find the random point in 
the chunk. Random point is the offset of insertion point in the 
chunk. The size of the chunk is increased exponentially to 
utilize the different panems of the second octet and to create 
high random density at the starting of the cipher field 
(explained in section IV). distributiveAlgorithm ensures the 
insertion of the random octet at the random position throughout 
the chunk, which is always in the range of 0 to cument chunk 
size. A chunk is a portion of input stream whose size is 
increasing logarithmically and dependent on the chunk number 
or chunk position. Each chunk is 2 times in size of its previous 
chunk and the first chunk is 1 byte wide. This is because every 
time the random pointer is pre-pended with one bit to point the 
random position, which results in twice as many points as by 
the earlier one, so the size is doubled every time. If pre-pending 
is not binary but rather octal or hex then chunk sizes will be 8 
times or 16 times ofits predecessor. 
Algorithm 2: Cipher text randomization and extraction 
Fetch packetnumherfiom 802.1 I protocol 
Reset Cipher-octet-cntr to 0; 
Reset octetsgrocessed to 0; 
While not end ofthe cipher text 
For Entire transmission 
If(randomgosition == current_position) then 
WEP input 
Scrambled WEP 
output 
Access to RC4 octets, 
Control signals 
Figure 2: Architecture of the implemented algorithm for scrambling 
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Figure 3: Ciphertext randomization 
/* (randomgosition = distributiveAlgorithm 
(No-of-insertedoctets, packet-number)) = 
Cipher-octet-cntr *I 
(Fetch random data content for  the octet ftom 
memoT AND 
Insert /he octet in the current position) OR 
(Remove the current octet from stream) 
ocatsgrocessed = octetsgrocessed+ I ;  
End if 
Insert an octet of cipher text ; 
Cipher-octet-cntr = Cipher-oc/et-cntr + I ;  
Fetch next cipher octet: 
End while 
End For 
SubProc: 
Return pos distributiveAlgorithm (No_of_inserted_octets, 
packet-number) 
pos = RC4(secret-key)[packet-number*i+2][0 to 
No-of-inserted-octets] 
I* packet-number*i+2 points to the second octet 
among the current set of RC4 octets used ' I  
End SubProc; 
B. Scrambling 
Performing the insert action in the above algorithms results 
in the scrambling of the original WEP cipher text . This action 
causes the insertion of the random octet at the random position 
obtaincd from the distributiveAlgorithm. Insertion could be the 
part of another protocol enhancing security or other robustness, 
but must not be the function of Secret Key, because 
combination of scrambling algorithm and it may cause major 
leak of secret key information. 
C. DeScrambling 
Performing the extract action in the above algorithms 
results in the Descrambling of the scrambled WEP cipher text. 
Tbc extracted octet is then made available for other processors 
if used for other enhancements. 
111. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALGORITHMS 
The cipher text is randomized in decreasing density of 
randomness. We are dividing cipher text into virtual chunks of 
different sizes and adding random contents at random positions 
in each chunk. The size of a chunk is determined by 2'"'""k 
"umber) 
We have implemented the proposed algorithm in MATLAB 
to verify the functionality at the system level. Furthermore, the 
algorithm is behaviorally modeled in VHDL to obtain 
hardware simulation and verification. The architecture of the 
implemented scrambling algorithm is given in Fig.2. The 
algorithm works as a post-processor to the WEP protocol. It 
takes the WEP input and applies randomness to it as specified 
in section 2. In the architecture, BAB (Bit Addressable' 
Memory Bank) has 2 banks of bit addressable memory. Bank 1 
is, of size 32 bits, used to hold input WEP content either IV 
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or ICV. Bank 2 is, of size 48 bits, used to hold the resultant 
randomized output of IV or ICV. Cntr 1 is used to point bits in 
Bank 1 for the IV starting of the packet and decreases across 
the length of the packet. 
Random insertion positions in above test simulation are 
calculated by the controller (shown in architecture), which has 
access to RC4 octets from WEP implementation. In the above 
test, the RC4 octet has a binary value of “0001 1100”. The last 
bits of the obtained RC4 octet are used to give different 
positions in the mth chunk between the range of 0 and the 
maximum chunk size. 
The dashed region in Fig. 3 is zoomed in Fig. 4 to illustrate 
the insertion of random octet in details. In every clock cycle, 
input is read and forwarded to output if the current state is 
“read-inpgort” state. When the current state is “insert” state, a 
control signal is sent to FIFO to wait for a clock cycle; in 
which the system inserts the random content. 
Iv. ANALYSIS OF THE SCRAMBLING ALGORITHMS 
Notation: 
n: number of bytes (octets) received as WEP cipher text 
N: number of bytes (octets) result of application of SA 
Cs: chunk size 
Cp: chunk position 
Ro: number of random octets 
d h :  density of random octets 
Algorithm 1 : 
Insertion of an 8-bit random octet in 24-bit IV at any 
random position, obtained from Calculate-randomgosition 
function, results in 6,144 (24’28) different patterns of the same 
IV. This means an attacker needs to analyze 6,144 more 
patterns to decrypt the message in case of an IV collision. 
Thus, the improvement in security is 6,144 times for IV based 
attacks. The same improvement in the ICV based attacks is 
8,192 (32*28) times as ICV is 32 bits long. 
Algorithm 2: 
Calculation of achieved randomization: 
We insert 1 octet per chunk thus 
No of octets inserted = N o  of chunks processed. 
No of chunks processed = I+log,(number of cipher text 
octets processed) 
Cp as a function of incoming octets can be written as 
cp(n) = ceil(log,(n)) (1) 
Each insertion has s positions among which one has to he 
selected randomly where s = chunk size. 
Before applying the algorithm, the size of a chunk at position 
Cp can be calculated as 
c s  tc,) = 2cp (2) 
Since every chunk has one random octet in it, the total 
number of random octets inserted can be given as 
Ro(n)  = 1 + C,(n) ( 3 )  
randomization(Cs) = Cs*28 (41 
For each chunk obtained randomization is: 
For C, chunks the total randomization will be 
fi c, (C,) x 28 
i=l 
which is the improvement in security for cipher text table based 
attacks. 
The density of inserted random octets in the cipher text can 
he given as 
- 
5 o 0.3 
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Figure 5 :  Density ofrandom Dctes 
As depicted in Fig. 5,  the density makes a peak at the first 2 
bytes of the insertion, and then it reduces logarithmically. The 
irregular peaks in the curve are caused by the insertion of the 
random octet. As it requires lesser computational power to 
retrieve original WEP cipher text from small number of input 
octets, so we used distributiveAlgorithm to keep high density 
of randomness at the beginning of frame and reducing 
logarithmically over the length of the frame. 
The number of octets in the modified packet will be given 
by 
N ( n )  = n + R d n )  (7) 
Fig. 6 illustrates the change in the cipher part of WEP 
packet due to the Algorithm2, which shows that for 50 input 
octets modified cipher will be 56 octets, and for 1024 octets it 
will be 1035 octets. 
Now, let us calculate the probability that an intruder will 
successhlly retrieve the cipher text stream from the scrambled 
WEP output. 
First, the probability of finding a random octet in a chunk 
can be given as 
C-78CI3-8255-2’Wu).Oo 02W4 IEE. 2490 
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Effective Ciphertext Size (in octets) 
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Figure 6: The number ofoctets in the modified packet against the number 
of incoming wtets 
Then, the probability of successfully retrieving the whole 
cipher text (i.e., breaking the scrambling algorithm for the 
cipher text randomization - The probability of finding all 
random octets) will be 
(9) 
,=I 
Probabilitv of successful retrieval of ciahertext 
I :  I 
- 2  4 n 6  8 10 
Figure 1: Probability of successful retrieval of cipher text 
As the number of cipher text octets increases linearly, the 
probability of breaking the scrambling algorithm for the cipher 
text randomization decreases exponentially. For the packets 
with a cipher text of 5 octets or more, the probability becomes 
0.00097 or less. 
Finally we calculate the computational difficulty in terms of 
the number of different panems generated for same data 
panem. Different pattems for the same 24-bit IV can be given 
as: 
CD,,, = 28 x 24 (10) 
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Different panems for the same n data hits can be given as: 
CD,-(~) = 28 xlog, ( n ) x  c,(n) ( I  1) 
Figure 8: Computational difficulty 
Fig. 8 shows the increase in the requirement of 
computational power to recover the WEP cipher text from the 
scrambled cipher text. 
Different panems for the same ICV can be given as: 
CDjc, = 2’ x 32 (12) 
Increased total computational difficulty can be given as 
CD ( n )  = CD,, + CD,(n)+ CD,,,, (13) 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A scrambling algorithm is proposed to patch WEP protocol. 
The algorithm is implemented in MATLAB and VHDL and is 
verified through simulations. Mathematically, it achieves an 
aggregate of at least 14848 times (6144 + 8192 + 512(for only 
one byte cipher text input)) improvement in WEP security. The 
hardware implementation of the algorithm requires only adding 
two counters, few registers and a simple controller. Thus the 
algorithm provides a robust WEP security system without 
substantially increasing the overall implementation cost. 
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